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Abstract 
 
Evolutionary economics offers clear insights into the mechanisms that underlie innovations, 
structural change and transitions. It is therefore of great value for the framing of policies 
aimed at fostering a transition to a sustainable development. This paper offers an overview of 
the main insights of evolutionary economics and derives core concepts, namely ‘diversity’, 
‘innovation’, ‘selection environment’, ‘bounded rationality’, ‘path dependence and lock-in’, 
and ‘coevolution’. These concepts are subsequently used to formulate guidelines for the role 
of the government and the design of public policies, such as the learning from historical 
technological pathways and the creation of an extended level playing field. In addition, the 
developments of certain energy technologies are examined in detail within the adopted 
evolutionary economics framework. Three particular technologies receive attention, namely 





This paper is based on a report (van den Bergh et al., 2005) written together with Albert 
Faber and Annemarth Idenburg from the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
(MNP). We are grateful for comments by many colleagues from the Institute for 
Environmental Studies of our university and from the MNP.   2
1. Introduction 
In this paper the recent attention for transitions with a particular focus on energy provision is 
linked to the older tradition of evolutionary thinking with regard to economic and 
technological change. The notion of transition has its origin in population dynamics and 
therefore relates well to evolutionary theory (Kemp, 1997; Rotmans et al., 2001; Geels, 
2002a; Geels, 2002b; van den Bergh, 2004; AER/VROMraad, 2004). A transition denotes a 
society-wide system innovation with a focus on basic or fundamental activities, such as 
energy provision, transport and agriculture (Rotmans et al., 2000). Alternative terms are 
employed in the literature, notably system innovation in the technological literature, 
industrial transformation in the environmental science literature, and structural change in 
both environmental and development economics. A main motivation for using the notion of 
transition is that while it links up with the notion of sustainable development, it has the 
advantage that it shift the attention from a vague end goal to stimulating transition processes 
as a more concrete step. Note, however, that both concepts are part of systems thinking, as a 
result of which they cannot avoid complex system analyses. 
  Different perspectives are possible on transitions. In fact, inspiration can be drawn 
from a wide range of disciplines and fields of study. For example: 
•  Innovation studies –  innovation systems and long waves (Kondratiev, Schumpeter, 
Freeman). 
•  Organisation studies - radical innovations, organisational change (Nelson/Winter, 
Hannan/Freeman/Caroll). 
•  History of technology. 
•  Sociology – multilevel institutions and networks. 
•  Development studies, including economic development theories (Rostow). 
•  Catastrophe studies – by anthropologists and others (Tainter, Diamond). 
•  Administrative and political sciences - political revolutions. 
•  Complex systems, including chaos theory (catastrophes, fractals en hysteresis) and 
evolutionary modelling. 
 
Transitions can be characterised in various ways. Four important dimensions of 
transitions can be identified. First, one may focus on aspects of hierarchy, aggregation and 
space. A multilevel perspective has been proposed in this respect, covering the niche, regime 
and landscape levels. Economists would refer to micro, meso and macro. Second, different 
temporal phases of a transition have been identified. In this respect a  life cycle  or multi-
stage development framework – consistent with insights from both marketing and 
development economics (Rostow) – has been used, distinguishing between pre-development   3
or conception, take-off, acceleration and growth, stabilisation or saturation (including 
standardisation), and senescence. Third, the literature on transitions emphasises that we are 
dealing with complex systems and complex changes, due to simultaneous and interactive 
structural changes in resources/inputs, sectors (supply), demand (life-styles), 
institutions/policy (legislation), culture (values). Finally, from a traditional technological 
perspective, notably long wave theories, clustering of innovations is stressed. The idea here 
is that  major, basic innovations are followed by derived and complementary innovations. 
Next, a typology of transitions can proceed along two lines. First, a distinction can 
be made between spontaneous or autonomous and steered or goal-oriented transitions. Most 
known, historical transitions are of the first type, which suggests that there is little to learn 
from history. The second type includes, for example, the Green Revolution in agriculture, 
and the shift from coal to gas in post-war Netherlands. A second typology is based on 
identifying the degree of complexity of a transition. One can distinguish between relatively 
simple (minor) versus complex (major) transitions, and even intermediate types. Examples of 
major transitions are the invention and use of fire, the rise of agriculture, and the Industrial 
Revolution. All of these have changed human society in the most fundamental way. 
Electrification and various transitions in transport (e.g. from horse and wagon to car) can be 
considered as intermediate types. Minor transitions include the already mentioned Green 
Revolution and shift from coal to gas. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that these minor 
transitions are the only steered transitions mentioned here. This may hint at major transitions 
being out of reach of (public) regulation by humans, and that transitions aimed at attaining a 
sustainable development need to be of ‘medium’ complexity. Finally, some foreseen 
transitions or transitions in an early phase are uncertain in terms of impact. This holds for 
information and communication technology, genetic modification technology and energy 
related technologies like hydrogen, solar PV and nuclear fusion. The latter will receive 
specific attention later on in this paper. 
The neoclassical economics perspective on transitions has been formulated by den 
Butter and Hofkes (2004). Two main sub-perspectives are relevant, namely based on general 
and partial equilibrium theories (micro and static) and on (endogenous) growth theories 
(macro and dynamic). The critical assumption of this perspective is rational, optimizing 
agents, both at the level of households and firms, and at that of regulators. From this 
perspective a number of suggestions can be derived. First, exogenous or endogenous changes 
in technology or resource availability stimulate responses. Price mechanisms play a central 
role here and are neglected in most other perspectives. They imply a market response to 
increased scarcity, taking the form of substitution in consumption and production, and 
(increased) R&D efforts. The neoclassical theory regards innovation as involving market   4
failures due to positive externalities of R&D or innovation, and advises to make sure that 
behaviour of innovators and users of innovations is appropriately informed (correcting prices 
to reflect positive externalities) or constrained (e.g., patent systems rewarding innovators and 
limiting or pricing any use of their innovations). The neoclassical economic theory suggests 
trends (growth theory) and smooth changes (equilibrium theory) rather than breaks, and 
allows both sectoral shifts and gradual replacement of old, obsolete by new, more profitable 
techniques within sectors. 
  In the remainder of this chapter we will present an evolutionary economics 
perspective. The starting point for this is the intuitive feeling that evolution (as a general 
theory) is our best bet to understand and manage dynamic complexity. Evolution is a 
rising star in many fields, including chemistry, computer science (evolutionary 
computation), psychology, sociology, economics and philosophy. Evolution is often 
misunderstood: it is not an easy theory. For this reason, we will spend some time 
explaining core aspects of evolutionary theory in economics. Section 2 provides a short 
introduction to evolutionary economics. Section 3 presents an evolutionary economics 
framework around six core concepts. Section 4 examines the characteristics of transition 
policy within the evolutionary economics framework. Section 5 offers an evolutionary 
economics evaluation of three potentially sustainable energy technologies, namely fuel 
cells, solar PV and nuclear fusion. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Evolutionary economics 
Despite the fact that Veblen (1898) had already called economics an evolutionary science, a 
coherent development of this idea had to await the work of Nelson and Winter in the 1960s 
and 1970s, which blended with the earlier work by Schumpeter to give an impetus to the 
neo-Schumpeterian school of evolutionary economics. Any evolutionary theory has to start 
from a population approach. This immediately clarifies an essential difference with 
traditional microeconomics, where the assumption of a representative agent is crucial. 
Contrary to common belief, such a microeconomics is not really as micro as is possible. In 
fact, evolutionary theories are ‘more micro’, because they describe populations with 
behavioural or technical diversity among individuals or firms. 
  Joseph Schumpeter was without any doubt the most influential of all early 
evolutionary economists. This is due to his general standing in economics, in Europe and 
the USA, as well as to the many important concepts and ideas that sprang from his mind. 
Schumpeter questioned the static approach of standard economics, and showed a great 
interest in the dynamics of economies, in particular the capitalist system, in all of his   5
major works (Schumpeter, 1934, 1939, 1942). He considered qualitative economic and 
technological change in a wider context of social change, focusing on the impact of the 
innovative ‘entrepreneur’ (Schumpeter, 1934: first published in German in 1911). 
Schumpeter regarded economic (capitalistic) change as the result of revolutionary forces 
from within the economy, which destroy old processes and create new ones: “creative 
destruction”. This allows for discrete or non-gradual changes, through clusters of derived 
innovations following a major invention. These themes were elaborated in his studies of 
business cycles (long waves). Although Schumpeter realized that discontinuities play a 
role, he did not assign to them the critical role that they have in Marx’s theory. Instead, 
he believed that political responses would lead to a gradual transition. Another important 
notion derived within his dynamic perspective is that of (what was called later) 
Schumpeterian versus equilibrium (neoclassical) competition, where Schumpeterian 
competition denotes a competitive advantage that is brought about by process or product 
innovation. 
  Since the 1950s, there has been a slow increase of publications on economic 
evolution. This can be partly explained by the success of evolutionary biology, the limits 
of neoclassical economics, and the search for evolutionary underpinnings of optimizing 
behavior as assumed by neoclassical economics (Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953). The 
most cited work since the 1950s has been that of Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, which 
culminated in their book “An evolutionary theory of economic change” (1982). Not only has 
this work influenced evolutionary economists in the neo-Schumpeterian tradition, but it has 
also been regarded as the most important evolutionary text by mainstream economics. The 
reason is that a formal, axiomatic approach to evolutionary economics is proposed, involving 
theoretical models and empirical, statistical applications. Nelson and Winter focus on firms 
and gradual change, assuming that firms are “…motivated by profit and engaged in search 
for ways to improve their profits, but their actions will not be assumed to be profit 
maximizing over well-defined and exogenously given choice sets” (p.4). Moreover, 
regarding their analysis, they state “… we do not focus our analysis on hypothetical states of 
‘industry equilibrium’, in which all the unprofitable firms no longer are in the industry and 
the profitable ones are at their desired size.” Nelson and Winter argue that their theory can 
do most of what neoclassical theory can do, and much more. The three building blocks of 
Nelson and Winter’s theory of microevolution are organization routines, search behavior and 
selection environment. A routine can be considered as the equivalent of the gene in 
biological evolution, having some durability and being subject to change due to selection.    6
  Various other, authentically evolutionary approaches have been proposed — perhaps 
with less impact (so far), but not necessarily less relevant. A diversity of approaches 
addresses the interface between evolutionary economics and organization theory. The 
most important recent proposal concerning the direction evolutionary economics should 
follow is perhaps Potts (2000). He presents a view of economic systems being like 
complex “hyperstructures”, i.e. nested sets of connections among components. Against 
this background, economic change and growth of knowledge are in essence a process of 
changes in connections. Potts suggests that connections and their changes have a spatial 
dimension as well, implying the relevance of the ‘geometry of space’. In line with the 
idea of changing connections, Potts calls for a new microeconomics based on the technique 
of discrete, combinatorial mathematics, such as graph theory, to study the change of 
microeconomic connections. This can be seen as a fundamental discussion of the need for 
multi-agent or population models. 
  The two main current schools of economic evolutionary thought include the neo-
Schumpeterian theories of technical change and evolutionary game theory. The first 
study phenomena at the firm level (technological innovation), the market and sector level 
(competition and diffusion, structural change), and at the macro-level (growth, long 
waves and international trade) (Dosi et al., 1988). It is recognized that the impacts of 
firm-level innovations are multifold. Innovation causes asymmetry in technology among 
firms, sectors and countries, leading to exchange and trade. Comparative advantages are 
not fixed but change due to innovation and diffusion. Trade itself stimulates diffusion of 
knowledge. In addition, technological change affects the division of labor, the 
organization of intra-firm and inter-firm relationships, and thus the industrial structure 
and patterns of intermediate deliveries. Moreover, some firms try to broaden their range 
of activities and products (maintain variety), not just to realize economies of scope, but 
to be resilient in the face of market and competitive selection. User-producer interactions 
may be important as well, such as geographical and cultural proximity, which can give 
rise to national or regional systems of innovation. 
  Within the neo-Schumpeterian literature on technological evolution, the notion of path 
dependence has received much attention. This is based on the idea that changes in population 
systems are characterized by increasing returns. These can be based on various phenomena, 
such as learning by using, bandwagon demand side effects (imitation), network externalities 
(e.g. telecommunication), informational increasing returns (if more adopted, then better 
known), and technological interrelatedness or complementarity (Arthur, 1989). Increasing 
returns are important in competition among alternative technologies. Who gets a larger   7
market share, by coincidence, has an advantage and can grow relatively quickly and at the 
cost of others. In standard economic terminology, one can translate this as “the existence of 
multiple equilibria”. The paths towards them are important, which is typically the study area 
of evolutionary economics. Consequences and characteristics of increasing returns are that 
inefficient equilibria can arise and a certain (inefficient) technology can be locked-in. With 
increasing returns, the process towards the final or equilibrium state of the system is path-
dependent (non-ergodic or historical), as it depends on the way ‘adoptions’ or ‘adaptations’ 
are cumulated. Non-ergodic systems look irregular, and have been linked to the notion of 
chaos in (temporal) data, which means that regularity and repetition are lacking. 
Evolutionary systems in general are non-ergodic because they consist of so much internal 
variety that the probability of a system revisiting an earlier state is negligible. Moreover, the 
specific diversity encountered in a particular state is critical for – i.e. limits – potential future 
paths of the system. A consequence of path-dependence is that the adoption process is very 
unstable and sensitive to initial events (historical coincidences or accidents). Ample 
empirical support exists for lock-in and path-dependence due to increasing returns. Well-
known examples of locked-in and suboptimal technologies are the QWERTY keyboard, the 
VHS video system, the fossil fuel engine, and the Windows operating system.  
A second current ‘school’, which is becoming more influential, is evolutionary game 
theory. It has three roots, although this is not often acknowledged. The first is formed by the 
writings of Alchian and Friedman, who attempted to found equilibrium theory on 
evolutionary theory. Indeed, evolutionary game theory is also known as equilibrium 
selection theory, because it solves the problem of multiple Nash equilibria common in 
nonlinear economic equilibrium models. The second root is the group of Chicago economists 
of the 1970s who studied selection, took ideas from sociobiology, and developed theory 
around the notion of utilitarian altruism. The third root is the method of evolutionary game 
analysis based on populations and selection, which was developed in biology (Maynard 
Smith, 1982). This method was originally used to support insights of sociobiology. 
Evolutionary game theory focuses on the existence of asymptotic equilibria. These are 
possible because no attention is given to a structural process of diversity generation, as a 
result of which selection completely dominates system dynamics. In other words, the 
interaction between innovation and selection, typical of evolution in reality, is missing. A 
more suitable name for evolutionary game theory is thus “selection game theory”.
  With regard to transitions two further issues are important, namely long waves and 
lessons from evolutionary biology. Long waves can be defined as cycles of prices, wages, 
and outputs of specific commodities (e.g. coal, iron), foreign trade, interest rates, and 
various other economic variables. The notion of waves or cycles suggests up and   8
downswing, or rise and decline, or boom and depression. Many different opinions have 
been expressed regarding the nature of waves as well as their causes (see the marvellous 
collection of classic articles in Freeman, 1996). Long waves are often regarded as being 
caused by major shifts in technology, due to fundamental advances in science. Freeman 
points out that various writers do not believe in the existence of long waves, even if they 
― evidently ― recognize fluctuations in economic variables over time. The problem 
arises from the combination of the complexity of long-term history, and the difficulty of 
empirically  assessing the precise causality behind the composition of long-waves 
phenomena. Reconstruction of historical data and statistical problems related to 'de-
trending' cause additional problems. Nevertheless, various types of cycles or waves have 
been identified (cf. Freeman, 1996): 
•  Kitchin cycle: forty months: related to keeping inventories; nowadays, similar 
short cycles may be due to political (election) cycles; 
•  Juglar or business cycle: 7-11 years: related to adjustment of investment in fixed 
assets responding with delays to price changes, i.e. inequality of demand and 
supply; 
•  Kuznets cycle: 15-30 years: this has been noted especially in the US and has 
been explained by waves of migration (possibly self-generating or endogenous 
through pull forces exerted by an upswing in the wave) and weather (exogenous 
'luni-solar tides' affecting rainfall and, in turn, crop production); and 
•  Kondratieff cycle: 40-60 years: Different particular explanations of long 
Kondratieff waves have been suggested. From an evolutionary angle, the most 
important explanation is that the source of new paradigms (e.g. fossil fuel-based 
industry, electricity) are radical innovations supported by fundamental advances 
in science, which run through particular sectors and firms that have a direct link 
between fundamental innovations and their processes and products, and which 
are most direct and influential in early stages of new technological paradigms. 
These advances are supportive of many processes and products, directly, or 
indirectly through process and product innovations. As a result, the innovative 
key factor or technology generates many related innovations (processes and 
products), causing a clustering in time of innovations. Together with a 
phenomenon similar to the product-life-cycle over time, characterised by an end 
phase of saturation, senescence and diminishing returns, to further investments   9
and marginal improvements in the dominant technology, this clustering of 
innovations gives rise to patterns that can be interpreted as long waves. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that transitions are not restricted to the context of socio-economic 
systems. Transitions are also prominent in evolutionary biology, as witnessed by the 
subsequent emergence of chemical cycles, protocells, cells, multicellular organisms, sex, 
animal groups, human societies (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995). This sequence 
suggests various trends: more complex specialisation, labour division, cooperation and 
emergence (= arising of new levels or meanings of reality).  These biological transitions are 
the result of self-organisation – not regulation: similar to how humans organize themselves 
in groups, firms, clubs and associations. This suggests that we can learn much from 
evolutionary biology, in terms of conceptualisation, methods and insights. 
 
3. An evolutionary economics framework 
Evolutionary economics is increasingly regarded as a useful approach for assessing 
processes of structural change, including developments in technology, innovation, 
organisations, economic structure and institutions. The evolutionary perspective on 
economics replaces the traditional neoclassical assumption of rational and optimising 
behaviour with the more realistic assumption of bounded rationality of economic agents. The 
concept of bounded rationality implies that agents are not fully informed and will not 
include all possibilities in their considerations for performing any behavioural or economic 
act. Much more often, agents rely on routines, heuristics and imitation (van den Bergh et al., 
2000). Bounded rationality is largely based on the idea that gathering full information is 
constrained by time and energy: it is simply impossible to collect all this information. 
Neither is it always useful to make a fully informed economic decision, since actions based 
on limited information usually offer a very satisfactory solution. Thus, a satisfactory 
outcome is often as good as or better than a perfect one, and it may be very rational in terms 
of costs related to achieving that solution. This concept of bounded rationality may take the 
form of routines, habits, imitation and a limited horizon in time and scale. 
  An important consequence of bounded rationality is heterogeneity in strategies of 
economic agents. This heterogeneity based on bounded rationality is contrary to the 
neoclassical economic approach with representative or average (rational) behaviour. 
Heterogeneity translates into diversity of economic strategies, technologies, agents and 
structure. Diversity is a central concept in the evolutionary framework, as it is regarded as a 
measure for the fitness of an economic or ecological system. Fitness is in itself a measure of 
survival and reproduction in a system. Diversity relates to fitness through Fisher’s Theorem:   10
‘The greater the genetic variability upon which selection for fitness may act, the greater the 
expected improvement in fitness’ (Fisher, 1930). The concept of diversity can be elaborated 
with three properties (Stirling, 2004): variety (the number of options in a portfolio), balance 
(the evenness of representation of the different options in the portfolio), and disparity (the 
degree to which the options in the portfolio are different from one another). All three 
dimensions will affect the outcomes of both innovation and selection. 
  System diversity will change over time as a result of the combined effect of innovation 
and selection. Innovation increases diversity in economic systems, analogous to mutation 
and re-combination in ecological systems. An increase in diversity implies an increase in 
opportunities for creative combinations contributing to the system’s survival and fitness. 
Innovation is often the result of serendipity: an outcome that results from combining insight 
and expertise with chance (Fine and Deegan, 1996). Knowledge is thus crucial for processes 
of innovation, as these often involve re-combinations of existing techniques or concepts. 
Systematic search (R&D, science) is a method to increase the chance of useful innovative 
combinations. 
  Innovations can be classified in various ways. One relates to the distinction between 
products, production and services. Another is between radical and incremental innovations. 
Incremental innovations are in line with the prevailing technological paradigm and often 
improve the performance of existing technologies. Incremental innovations usually reinforce 
the technological system they align with. Radical innovations, on the other hand, fall outside 
the prevailing technological paradigm and usually involve combinations of very different 
concepts and technologies. The 12
th century windmill can be seen as a combination of 
waterwheel milling technology and sailing technology aimed at the use of wind energy 
(Mokyr, 1990: p. 44). Incremental innovations are far more common than radical 
innovations, but the influence of the latter can be enormous. A certain level of geographical 
or institutional isolation may be useful for harbouring radical innovations, that is, to allow 
for technological niches apart from the dominant technological regime. Iceland has recently 
put this notion into practice by developing a technological niche regime aimed at enhancing 
the concept of a hydrogen economy. 
  Diversity is reduced by processes of selection. Selection refers to the survival and 
reproduction of succesful agents or strategies in a system. A selection environment involves 
physical, physiological and geographical constraints, and in economic systems also 
technological, organisational, economic or institutional dimensions. Selection should not be 
simplified as ‘survival of the fittest’, but rather as the survival of the sufficiently fit –
sufficiently adapted – species in a changing selection environment. In a natural system, 
different species choose different survival strategies. A similar specialisation process applies   11
to economic systems, where agents adapt their economic activities to the extent to which 
they can occupy their own niche in the economic system. 
  Repeated selection can result in a path dependent development. This depends on 
increasing returns that result from demand and supply side factors like scale advantages, 
‘learning-by-using’, imitation, network externalities and information effects (what is sold 
most is best known and thus sells more) and technical complementarity (Arthur, 1989). 
Increasing returns are a type of positive feedback or self-reinforcing mechanisms. These 
mechanisms can easily end in the dominance of a particular technological or economic 
regime. Moreover, this process may be reinforced by incremental innovations based on 
previous innovations within the dominant regime. The situation where technologies become 
dominant due to positive feedback mechanisms is often referred to as lock-in. An often used 
example of a locked-in technology is the QWERTY keyboard. This keyboard is sometimes 
seen as lacking the efficiency of the ‘Dvořák keyboard’, but due to institutional and 
organisational embedding it is still dominant, even though the original technological 
advantages based on the setting of the type bars in the typewriter are no longer relevant in 
computer keyboards. Processes of path dependency introduce history into economic 
dynamics, since technological developments tend to follow irreversible pathways. This is an 
important distinction from neoclassical economic theory, which suggests that a system is 
reversible, that is, it can return to an optimal configuration. It should be noted that lock-in 
and path dependency make it particularly difficult to introduce and proliferate technologies 
outside the dominant technological regime. Reducing the chances of lock-in requires 
maintenance of diversity, and more generally, an extended level playing field (see the next 
section). 
  A final core evolutionary concept is coevolution. This concept refers to the mutual 
influence and interference between two or more systems or populations: one system may 
exert selection pressure upon another system and vice versa, leading to related evolutionary 
developments in both systems. Coevolution is thus a particular concept of dynamic 
interaction between two populations with internal diversity (van den Bergh and Stagl, 2003; 
Winder et al., 2005). An early application of this concept to socio-economic systems was 
done by Norgaard (1984). He introduced feedbacks between five partial systems of 
knowledge, values, organisation, technology and environment. Variations in each of these 
systems are strongly influenced by the other systems and vice versa. An example is the 
introduction of pesticides, which not only triggered higher crop yields and a policy effect, 
but also an increase in resistance of the pest to the vermin. Another example is the 
coevolution following the domestication of animals, which triggered not only large-scale 
cultural and economic changes in early societies, but also led to artificial selection of plants   12
and animals (Campbell, 1996: p. 569). Later this was followed by a coevolution of human 
diseases and bacteria and viruses derived from animals (Diamond, 1997). An example of 
coevolution between economic systems is provided by the heavy organic chemical industry 
in the United States, which was coal-based in the beginning of the last century. In the 1920s, 
the rapid growth in demand for petrol (gas) for automobiles in the United States supplied a 
large and inexpensive supply of olefins as a by-product in the refining process. By the end of 
WWII, the US chemical industry had fully changed to petroleum-based feedstocks (Ruttan, 
2002). It is interesting to see that present-day sustainability policies sometimes refer to a new 
transition in the chemical sector, which should be based on biomass feedstocks. It may well 
be that changes in other economic systems are required in order to be able to make such 
changes in the chemical industry. 
  When these concepts and their interactions are taken together, a picture arises as shown 





Figure 1. A simplified picture of the evolutionary economy 
 
4. Transition policy within the evolutionary economics framework 
The evolutionary economic framework and its concepts give rise to a number of insights 
regarding transition policy and management. Although evolutionary processes are 
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fundamentally without a goal or target, normative elements can be added by policy-makers. 
An important lesson of evolutionary economics is, however, that policy-makers should 
refrain from ‘picking winners’, since it can never be known beforehand what the winners 
will be in terms of economic, environmental or social benefits. Policy-makers could put 
evolutionary economics into practice by creating conditions under which evolutionary 
processes will lead to socially desirable outcomes. An evolutionary-based policy will focus 
on influencing the selection environment, promoting innovative strength, and making 
advantageous use of coevolution. An important element of an evolution-inspired policy is to 
promote diversity as a goal in itself. Evolutionary economics as inspiriation for 
environmental policy has received some attention (e.g., Faber and Proops, 1990; Norgaard, 
1994; Kemp, 1997; Gowdy, 1999; van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2000). 
  A starting point for an evolutionary environmental policy lies in the concept of path 
dependency. It is of key importance to realise that most developments are decided in their 
early phases, and care is needed to foster new technologies and experiments in the early 
phases. It will still be important to keep an eye on all phases of an innovation or technology 
development. This is to maintain sufficient diversity in technologies, from both the 
innovation (potential for combinations) and selection (acting upon diversity) perspectives. 
Diversity management should focus on stimulating a wide range of technologies and 
strategies in terms of variety, disparity and balance. Diversity of technologies and strategies 
introduces resilience and robustness in environmental policy, which goes beyond the 
concepts of efficiency and unilinear (economic) growth. 
  Diversity management requires an ‘extended level playing field’, where alternative 
technologies, organisations and institutions can compete with more dominant elements. A 
number of conditions needs to be met if a credible extended level playing field is to be 
realised. First, prices need to reflect all the external costs generated by activities and 
products. Secondly, technologies that are low on the learning curve, but at the same time 
may be expected to have large sustainability potential in the long run, need to receive special 
support, either by creating niches or by providing subsidies. Exposing such technologies to 
free market competition where short-term cost-effectiveness dominates is not a good strategy 
in trying to make a transition to long-term sustainability. An early lock-in of unsustainable 
technologies should therefore be avoided, as it will go along with an early decease of 
potentially attractive technologies (see Box 1 for a theoretical example of this due to energy 
saving). A third condition for an extended level playing field is to try to expose different 
technological options to similar selection mechanisms.   14
Box 1: Evolutionary assessment of energy saving 
The notions of lock-in and environmental policy may be illustrated by experiences from energy-
saving policy. Energy-saving strategies often imply an increased efficiency of the use of fossil fuels. 
There are two different types of energy-saving strategies: (1) one decreasing the demand for useful 
energy (e.g. insulating homes or decreasing the air resistance of cars) and (2) the other increasing the 
efficiency of converting fossil fuels into useful energy. A decreased demand for useful energy will not 
alter the economic advantage of one fuel over the other. An increased conversion efficiency of fossil 
fuels, however, will decrease the costs per unit of useful energy based on fossil fuel, and thereby 
strengthen the economic advantage and lock-in of these fuels. Consequently, the increased conversion 
efficiency of fossil fuels could hamper the transition towards an energy system based on more 
sustainable energy resources. 








The solid line shows CO2 emissions due to a large-scale transition to sustainable energy production, 
while the broken line shows CO2 emission in an energy-savings scenario. Cumulative emissions in the 
transition scenario are a+b. Cumulative emissions in the energy-saving scenario are a+c. The most 
attractive scenario (in terms of reductions) depends on whether b>c or b<c. Now, if time before the 
point of transition increases, b increases compared to c, thus making energy savings more attractive. 
On the other hand, since the saving of energy is progressing well (especially in the initial stages of this 
scenario), policies for rendering a transition may become less interesting. Energy-saving may hamper 
the sense of urgency that is often considered necessary for a transition to sustainable energy 
production. 
            This raises a theoretical argument against energy-saving policies. In practice, however, it is 
conceivable to elaborate a more diverse and sophisticated policy strategy, aimed at a sustainability 
transition in the longer term, but to maintain energy-saving policies in the shorter term. This may not 
be the most cost-effective approach, but it does line up with the theoretical perspectives from the 
evolutionary economic theory and thus yields a more diverse and robust economy. 
 
Diversity increases through innovation. Innovation in evolutionary policy-making can be 
reinforced by increasing the chance of realising creative combinations, by stimulating 
attractive future perspectives, and by supplying capital and facilitation, through a level of 








concept of serendipity could become operational through the creation of innovative 
networks, with a focus on cross-fertilisation and stimulation. Such cross-fertilisation from 
different institutional systems may also lead to fruitful coevolution. An example is applying 
our experience from natural gas systems to set up distribution systems in the hydrogen 
economy. Isolated experiments and initiatives on the other hand may yield unique and 
surprising technological pathways outside the dominant regime. Such initiatives may be 
useful in small-scale incubator settings, where experiments are fostered as possible 
contributors for future solutions. 
  It is crucial for evolutionary policy-makers to balance between diversity and selection, so 
as to prevent a system ending up in either deadlock or inefficiency. Here, it is important to 
balance the cost of diversity in the short term against the benefits of diversity in the longer 
term. This trade-off can never be made on the basis of full information, but relies on expert 
estimation of chances, barriers and opportunities. On a larger scale – e.g. Europe as 
compared to any one of its countries – it may be easier to balance between diversity and 
efficiency, since relatively minor technologies may also reach a minimal scale advantage at 
this level. With this insight, policy-makers should be invited to align trajectories for 
sustainable development in large-scale co-operation, such as in the EU Framework 
programmes. 
  It is important to note that evolutionary theory does not offer an ‘optimal policy’. 
Bounded rationality prevents economic agents from optimising their economic 
behaviour. An implication of evolutionary theory is that pricing instruments will not 
even realize efficiency at the level of individual agents (van den Bergh et al., 2000). The 
efficiency – and effectiveness – of such instruments is therefore overestimated in 
traditional economic analysis and policy-making. 
 
5. Evolutionary economics assessment of three specific energy technologies 
In this section, the role of the evolutionary economic concepts that were discussed above will 
be explored in three concrete examples of new energy technologies that might play a role in 
the development of a sustainable energy supply. These are: fuel cells, nuclear fusion and 




Fuel cells are clean and efficient energy transformation appliances, which convert a fuel 
(usually hydrogen) into electricity (and heat). In general discussions, fuel cells are often 
related to the ‘hydrogen economy’. Within such a perspective, hydrogen is regarded as the   16
central energy carrier while fuel cells are considered as important mechanisms of energy 
transformation. Thanks to fuel cells there is a high level of diversity in techniques, 
applications and companies. With regard to the innovation aspects, fuel cells can be 
considered a radical innovation, characterised by strong interactions between different 
industries (inter alia the chemical industry, energy companies and car manufacturers). Niche 
markets can be found in aeronautics and (‘zero emission’) motor vehicles. Liberalisation of 
energy markets (provided that there is a level playing field) and stringent environmental 
policy might be conducive to creating a favourable selection environment for fuel cells. 
Bounded rationality could hamper the introduction of fuel cells, as it requires a clean break 
with existing routines and long-term, risky investments. Nevertheless, if one sheep leaps 
over the ditch, the rest will follow (we can already observe this imitative behaviour among 
car manufactureres, many of whom are now working on fuel-cell cars). Path dependency and 
lock-in in existing technologies (such as the internal combustion engine and batteries) imply 
an important barrier for fuel cells. On the other hand, economies of scale in the application 
of fuel cells are limited, which means that they would fit very well into small-scale, 
decentralised energy systems. In terms of coevolution, a strong interdependence between fuel 
cells and other components of the energy system can be noted (such as the fuel supply 
infrastructure). 
  The Dutch as well as the larger European fuel-cell arena is still very much focused on the 
R&D phase, since large-scale commercial application is still beyond the horizon. Many 
technical and economic barriers remain to be overcome. However, small niche markets are 
already in place, often in hybrid applications. Increasing demand for fuel cells may now be at 
the turning point of opportunity: further new applications will be increasingly important, so 
as to allow the technology to move forward on the learning curve. The government may play 
a role here, both as legislator and large customer.  
 
Nuclear fusion 
The path of nuclear fusion to commercial application has long been said to be about 50 years 
and remains so to date. Much research is still very fundamental and even application-
oriented projects are very much focused on experimenting with fundamental principles. The 
high costs involved and the still distant benefits largely exclude private partners from the 
research. A very centralised energy technology like nuclear fusion only allows for very 
large-scale units. Present-day experimental units are thus very expensive. Even though 
commercial application may still be beyond the horizon, the learning curve is passing very 
fast, even when compared to the well-known Moore’s Law for the evolution of computer 




Figure 1. Fusion experiments have kept pace with other hi-tech developments over the last 
30 years.  
Note: Since the early Russian T3 tokamak, the performance of fusion plasmas has doubled every 1.8 
years (blue line). The performance of fusion plasmas is defined in terms of the triple product (density 
× temperature × time). This triple product compares favourably with the doubling of the energy of 
particle accelerators every 3 years (green line), and the doubling of the number of transistors on a chip 
every 2 years (red line). The dashed line at the top shows the performance expected with ITER 
(Source: Hoang and Jacquinot, 2004). 
 
The high costs involved in nuclear fusion allow for only one type of fusion technology, the 
one based on Tokomak installations. A second important element is the high level of co-
operation, illustrated by the continuous interaction between the United States and the Soviet 
Union even during the Cold War period. Finally, the vision on the future is very utopian in 
attractiveness: large-scale application of nuclear fusion requires cheap, unlimited and widely 
availabe fuel (water) and causes hardly any environmentally harmful emissions. All these 
features allow for a fast learning curve for nuclear fusion. 
  When assessing nuclear fusion for the six evolutionary economic aspects that we have 
distinguished, it is obvious that the degree of diversity in this technology is very low. The 
main observation concerning the factors relating to innovation, is that there is a lot of 
(worldwide) co-operation within a relatively small network of experts, whose interactions 
with other sectors are limited. There are, as yet, no (niche) markets for the technology, of 
which the viability will be strongly dependent on a favourable selection environment, in 
which stringent CO2 policies will have to play an important role. With respect to bounded   18
rationality, it can be said that there is a lack of interest among private investors (due to the 
long time horizon involved) and an absence of established routines on which to base the 
technology’s application. With respect to path dependency and lock-in, the huge investments 
in fusion technology would clearly seem to have an irreversible character and economies of 
scale are extremely important. This implies that nuclear fusion will fit in well to the existing 
large scale electricity supply regime, but it is incompatible with a decentralised energy 
supply system. Regarding coevolution, there is very little exchange to be noted with other 
areas of energy technology, but some complementarity between areas of expertise relevant 
for nuclear fusion can be observed (e.g. plasma physics and materials science). 
 
Photovoltaic cells (PV) 
Photovoltaic (PV) or solar cells are seen in sharp contrast to nuclear fusion in the sense that 
the first type of energy production is conceptually very de-centralised. The silicon-based PV 
cell was discovered more or less by accident in the electronics industry, making it a good 
example of serendipity. The concept of applying thin film cells originated in photography, 
providing a good example of cross-fertilisation. Niche markets for PV applications, first 
developed in aerospace technology, were later extended to off-grid applications such as 
marine light beacons. PV applications may be grid-coupled, although there is no 
fundamental need to do so. Scale advantages in application are very limited. Many off-grid 
applications in remote areas, for example, are conceivable or already in place. Investment 
costs are, however, still very high, even though the learning curve is proving to be rapid, 
very much due to learning-by-doing experiences. Large-scale application opportunities in the 
Netherlands are seen as being limited, since the Dutch electricity network is very dense, thus 
not allowing for many off-grid niche markets. Large-scale application in other parts of the 
world will certainly require a break in the technological regime, as the PV production units 
can be applied in a much more decentralised context than present power production units. 
  In addressing PV in terms of the six evolutionary-economic aspects, we can make the 
following observations. Diversity is high in several respects: companies dealing with PV-
technology display a large variety (both in size and type of industry); a number of different 
technologies are in existence, in addition to the ‘traditional’ monocrystalline silicon cells, 
and there is a wide range of (potential) areas of application. With respect to innovation, 
serendipity, cross-fertilisation and niche markets have played an important role in the 
development of PV. On the other hand, the lack of an authoritative, coherent future   19
perspective on the role of PV may have been a restraining factor.
1 In the selection 
environment for PV, government policies form an essential factor. PV is still an expensive 
technology and will remain dependent on subsidies and other preferential policy measures 
for quite some time. Among the elements of bounded rationality, it is the short-time horizons 
of private investors that stand out. PV is capital intensive, with a long lifetime and low 
operational costs. Its financial performance is therefore highly dependent on the discount rate 
or payback period applied by the investor. As far as path-dependency and lock-in are 
concerned,, we can mention that because PV can hardly benefit from economies of scale in 
application, it is therefore particularly suitable for systems of decentralised electricity supply. 
Finally, with respect to co-evolution a relevant feature of PV is its intermittent character (due 
to the fluctuations in solar energy influx). This implies that application of PV application 




Transitions are being studied in many ways, including various theoretical perspectives. Here 
it has been suggested that an evolutionary economics angle provides clear insight into the 
mechanisms that underlie transitions to a sustainable development. After a discussion of the 
meaning of transitions and evolutionary economics, a framework was presented around six 
central evolutionary concepts. These are ‘diversity’, ‘innovation’, ‘selection environment’, 
‘bounded rationality’, ‘path dependence and lock-in’, and ‘coevolution’. Next transition 
policy and management were discussed. Here the notion of an extended level playing field 
was emphasized which requires in addition to perfect market competition three other 
conditions, namely charging of negative environmental externalities in prices, resisting early 
lock-in, and striving for alternative, competing options to be on equal positions on their 
learning curves. It was further argued that energy conservation does not only have beneficial 
effects but may also delay an energy transition, suggesting a limit to (optimum level of) this 
option. 
  The case studies reveal some features that may also be relevant for other cases where the 
implications of evolutionary economic insights for the development and application of new 
(energy) technology are at stake. First of all, government policies have been mainly directed 
towards stimulating R&D. This has contributed to the progress made in creating better, 
cleaner and more efficient technologies. However, in order to ensure that these technologies 
                                                   
1 To some extent, the publication in September 2004 by the European Commission of  ‘A Vision 
for Photovoltaic Technology for 2030 and Beyond’ may have filled this gap.  
See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/energy/photovoltaics/introduction_en.html   20
continue to advance on their learning curve, policies should (in addition) be directed more 
towards application and diffusion. The independent variable of the learning curve is 
cumulative production/application of the technology, and this variable has to increase 
exponentially in order to achieve an (also exponential) reduction in production cost (or 
price). 
  Stimulating the market is also of particular relevance in order to break out of the 
‘chicken-and-egg’ problem that potential investors in a new technology take a wait-and-see 
attitude, hoping for lower prices and better quality, which are in turn dependent on growth in 
cumulative investment volumes. Creating a favorable selection environment (e.g. by creating 
or stimulating niche markets) can be conducive to this break-out.  
  Stimulating specific technologies should not be seen as a way of ‘picking the winners’, 
but rather as a matter of promoting diversity, preventing lock-in and providing fair chances 
to competing technologies. 
  Creating a favorable selection environment seems to be at odds with the current trends of 
privatisation and government retreat from areas with traditionally strong public involvement 
(such as energy, housing and public transport). A reconsideration of the government’s role in 
these areas would therefore be advisable, as these are sectors where economies of scale and 
long term investments are paramount, and the risks of lock-in and suboptimal results are 
therefore high if everything is left to the market. 
  A dilemma facing the policymaker could be: should investments in improving 
‘traditional technologies’ and in ‘hybrid’ technologies be encouraged or not? On the one 
hand, this could contribute to the ‘lock in’ of the ‘old’ system; on the other hand, experience 
shows that a hybrid technology can be an intermediate step towards a technological 
breakthrough. A final solution for this dilemma cannot be given on the basis of our case 
studies. 
  Future visions can play a useful role as a source of inspiration. Recently, initial steps 
have been made to sketch such visions at EU level for fuel cells and for PV. It seems 
worthwile to continue working on these (and other) energy future visions. 
  Finally, the importance of exchange, co-operation and cross-fertilisation should be 
emphasised. The case studies confirm that technological breakthroughs often find their 
origin in applying knowledge from a totally different industry or discipline. One might 
therefore advise policy makers to bring together people from very divergent areas, so 
that they can exchange ideas and find unexpected solutions.   21
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